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COMMENTS
REVOCATION OF AGENCY BY DEATH OF PRINCIPAL
The 1941 Florida statute, which validates the acts of an agent done
after the death of the principal in the absence of knowledge of the
death by the third party,' abolishes a rule of common law long established and confirmed by judicial decision in this and the great majority
of other jurisdictions. Under the common law rule, the death of a
I Sec. 709.01, Fla. Stat. 1941 "Power of Atty: If any agent, constituted
by power of attorney or other authority, shall do any act for his principal
which would be lawful if such principal were living, the same shall be
valid and binding on the estate of said principal, although he or she
may have died before such act was done; provided, the party treating
with such agent dealt bona fide, not knowing at the time of the doing
of such act that such principal was dead. An affidavit, executed by the
attorney in fact or agent setting forth that he has not or had not,
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principal is considered as an instantaneous and absolute revocation of
the authority of his agent,2 with the singular exception of those agencies
wherein the agent's power is coupled with an interest.3 The fact that
the agent and third party have dealt in good faith and have not, or
even could not have, apprised themselves of the death of the principal
is considered insufficient grounds for avoiding the application of
the rule.4
Pearl Harbor cast a legal spotlight on the impracticability of this
ancient common law doctrine. The war converted death from a remote
but ascertainable possibility into a common occurrence which often took
place on the other side of the globe and often remained undisclosed for
weeks, months, and even years. It quickly became manifest that adherat the time of doing any act pursuant to the power of attorney, received
actual knowledge or actual notice of the death of the principal, or notice
of any facts indicating his death, shall in the absence of fraud be
conclusive proof of the absence of knowledge or notice by the agent
of the death of the principal at such time. If the exercise of the power
requires the execution and delivery of any instrument which is recordable under the laws of the state, such affidavit shall likewise be recordable. No report or listing, either official or otherwise, of "missing"
or "missing in action" regarding any person in connection with any
activity pertaining to or connected with the prosecution of any war in
which the United States is then engaged, as such words "missing" or
"missing in action" are used in military parlance, shall constitute or
be interpreted as constituting actual knowledge or actual notice of the
death of such principal, or notice of any facts indicating the death of
such person, or shall operate to revoke the agency. (Laws 1945,
c.23011, 1.)."
2 Long v. Thayer, 150 U.S. 520, 37 L.Ed. 1167, 14 S.Ct. 189 (1893);
Dallam v. Sanchez, 56 Fla. 779, 47 So. 871 (1909); McGriff v. Porter,
5 Fla. 373 (1853); Harper v. Little, 2 Me. 14, 11 Am. Dec. 25 (1822);
Brown v. Cushman, 173 Mass. 368, 53 N.E. 860 (1899); Clayton v.
Merritt, 52 Miss. 353 (1876) ; Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N.Y. 600, 21 N.E.

985 (1889); Davis v. Windsor Savings Bank, 46 Vt. 728 (1873); Watson
v. King, 4 Campb. 272, 170 Eng. Reprints 87 (1815) ; Kent, Commentaries,
Vol. 2, P. 646; Story, Agency (7th Ed.) Sec. 488; Tiffany, Agency
(2d Ed.) Sec. 87.

This rule is supported by the Amer. Law Inst., RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY, Sec. 120.
174, 5 L.Ed. 589 (1823);
3 Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. (U.S.)
McGriff v, Porter, 5 Fla. 373 (1853); Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v.
Wilson, 139 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E. 784 (1893); Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v.
Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342, 64 A.L.R. 368 (1927); Lane Mortgage
Co. v. Crenshaw, 93 Cal. App. 411, 269 Pac. 672 (1928); See RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, Sees. 138, 139; as to what constitutes a Power
coupled with an Interest, see Annotation, 64 A.L.R. 380.
4 Dallam v. Sanchez, 56 Fla. 779, 47 So. 871 (1909); Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N.Y. 264, 34 N. E. 784 (1893).
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ence to the common law rule made dealings by and with agents of
members of the armed forces an unwarranted risk for all parties
concerned. Taking notice of the exigencies of the times, many states
enacted legislation during the war years modifying the common law
rule by giving binding effect to the acts of an agent or attorney in fact
performed subsequent to the death of the principal where the transaction was entered into in good faith without knowledge of the death.
The majority of these statutes, however, were expressly restricted to
members of the military forces, were terminable at the end of the war,
and were effective only as concerned written and recorded powers of
attorney.5 In general then, these statutes were temporary measures,
enacted as wartime expedients. They did not repudiate the common law
doctrine, but merely suspended its operation in a special limited class of
cases for a limited period of time. By negative inference, the fact that
th law making bodies refused to alter permanently the common law rule
when the opportunity was ripe and the problem brought clearly to issue,
seems rather to imply a general concurrence in its continued utility. The
Florida statute, although by no means unprecedented, is couched in terms
of permanency and represents an express rejection of the common law
doctrine.
As in many cases -where a venerable doctrine of the common law is
modified or supplanted by statute, judicial decisions pointed the direction
for the legislative change. Expressly deviating from the rule of the civil
law which renounced the distinction, common law courts have attributed
to the revocation of an agency different characteristics according to
whether such revocation was effected by action of the principal or by
operation of law. The general rule that an express revocation is effective
as against innocent third parties dealing in good faith with the erstwhile
agent only from such time as the third party has notice of the revocation 7 was held inapplicable in those instances where the revocation
5 See, for example, Ala. Code, Tit. 37A, See. 46 (1943); Conn. Cum.
Supplement (1946); Ga. Code, P. 398 (1945); Ill. Statutes, Sec. 30-27A;
Ind. Statutes, Sec. 59-1201; Iowa Code, Chap. 66 (1945); Kentucky (1944)
H.B. 1603; New Jersey Stat., Tit. 46, Sec. 2B-1; Pa. Statutes, Sec. 21-304;
Ohio (120 Ohio L. 1943); Va. (Michie's Code, 1943-Supp. 1944, Sec.

2673); Wyoming (1943 Sess. Laws, Ch. 78).
s The first sentence of the Florida statute is substantially the same
as that of S. C. Code (Sec's. 7018-7019) (19-);
Other states with
statutes of permanent effect are California, Calif. Code See. 2356;
Maryland (Art. 10, Sec. 41, Flach's Code 1938 and 1943; Miss. (Miss.
Code 1942-See. 248; Wisconsin (Sis. Statutes, Sec. 235.54, 234.06
(1943); Louisiana (Civil Code, Sec. 3032); So. Dakota (Code, 1939 Sec.

3.0109).
7 "Persons who deal with an agent before notice of the recall of his
powers are not affected by the recall." Hatch v. Coddington, 95 U.S. 48,
24 LEd. 339. See also Johnson v. Christian, 128 U.S. 374, 32 L.Ed. 412,
9 S.Ct. 87 (1888); Cooper v. Cooper, 206 Ala. 519, 91 So. 802 (1921);

Carr v. Moragne, 136 S.C. 218, 131 S.E. 424 (1926); Annotation, 43
A.L.R. 1218.
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was effectuated by operation of law, the courts attributing to death,
lunacy, or other legal incapacity of the principal, an instanter and
complete termination of the ageney? Notwithstanding the great number
of decisions strictly applying this dogmatic distinction, the frequent
inequitable consequence of its application were found too bitter and
impractical a legal pill for many courts to swallow. Attacking the

common law doctrine insofar as it applied to innocent third parties as
illogical, unjust and contrary to public policy and the needs of the
times, those courts by their dicta would abolish the distinction, and
by their decisions would restrict the application of the coinion law
doctrine to those acts which the agent was incapable of doing except
in the express name of his principal. 9
"Undoubtedly the rule is that the death of a principal instantly
terminates the agency. But it by no means follows that all dealings
with the agent thereafter are absolutely void. Where, inl good faith,
one deals with an agent within his apparent authority, in ignoraice

of the death of the principal, the heirs and representatives of the
latter may be bound, in case the act is not required to be performed
in the name of the principal." 10
Other courts, finding the common law rule so firmly entrenched as
to make any deviation therefrom ain unjustifiable invasiqn of the legislative realm, adhered to the common law, blt with open reluctance:
"The common law rule has become too firmly established in
this state to be disturbed by judicial action, although a change by
the law making power would be in harmony with more enlightened
views and would promote the interests of justice."'"

The Florida statute carries this trend to its logical conclusion. It is
permanent and general. It further transcends the restrictive scope of
most of the liberalizing decisions by validating "any act" done by the
agent -with a third party ignorant of the principal's death, and not merely

those which could be done in the agent's name.
In view of the honorable antiquity of the common law doctrine, the

plethora of respectable decisions sustailihg it, and the refusal of other
state legislatures to effect a change similar to that in Florida, we imust
consider anew the rationale of the common law rule in order to determine whether the new statutory modification is actually nio.re hi har-

mony with the needs and policies of modern times. Why was it that

the common law on the one hand recognized as valid acts of an agent
done after the revocation of his authority hut before notice to third
persons, but on the other hand excepted from this general and equitable
s Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Wilson, supra.
9 Dick v., Page. 17 Mo. 234, 51 Am. Dec. 267 (1852); Carrington v.

Whittington, 26 Mo. 311, 72 Am. Dee. 212 (1858); Deweese v. Muff,
57 Neb. 17, 77 N.W. 361 (1898): Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520 (1858),
13 Ohio St. 574 (1862); Catlin v. Reed, 141 Okla. 14, 283 Pac. 549. 87
A.L.R. 1410 (1929); Cassiday v. Mackenzie, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 282,
39 Am. Dec. 76; See Annotation, 67 A.L.R. 1421.
10 Deweese v. Muff, supra, cited in Catlin v, Reed, 283 Pac. 553.
11 Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Wilson, 34 N.E. 784, 785.
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rule acts done after the principal's death? One factor contributing to
the special attributes accorded death as an absolute determinant of an
agency was the common law notion that death is a notorious event of
which every person is presumed to be aware. However justified this
view may have been at one time, it is a complete fiction in the everexpanding far-flung business world of today. Most courts, however,
justified the common law distinction by expounding the professed impossibility of having an agent without a principal, dismissing as a
"manifest absurdity" the valid execution of an act on behalf of a dead
luan.12 As one commentator expressed this argument, "The absurdity of
the opposite rule appears from this,-'I, P, some time dead, by A
my agent do this act.' ,"
Even on this unrealistic level of theory, however, the common law
doctrine is of dubious merit. By admitting that in the case of ordinary
revocations subsequent acts are valid where made in good faith and
without knowledge of the revocation, it necessarily follows that the
validity of the contract does not depend upon the technical existence of
the agency status. The fundamental fact that the agent has ceased to
have authority to represent his principal obtains whether the revocation
be actual or by operation of law.
The reason why transactions are considered binding upon a principal
who has revoked an agency as respects those ignorant of the termination
are evident. The transactions having been made on behalf of the principal, who constituted the agent as such, held him out to the public and
invited confidence to be reposed in him, arid thus caused others to deal
with him as agent, the principal should be deemed precluded from
denying the existence of the agency upon the equitable principle of
14
estoppel in pais.
"Where a person by his statements, conduct, behavior, concealment, or even silence has induced another who .has a right to rely
upon those statements, etc., and who does rely upon them in good
faith to believe in the existeLce of a certain state of facts with
which they are compatible arid act upon that belief, the former will
not be allowed to assert as against the latter the existence of a
different state of facts from that indicated by his statements or
conduct if the latter has so far changed his position that he would
be iihjured thereby.''' 5
'[his reasoning applies equally where the revocation is effected by
death and 1o cogent reason appears why the rule of estoppel in pals

should lot govern equally in both cases. I)eath may hush the voice of
the principal and so prevent him from informing the world of the
revocation thus effected, but why should not the onus of giving notice
of the termination of the agency pass to the principal's successors, instead
i2 Hunt v. Rousmanier, MeGriff v. Porter, Davis v. Windsor Savings
Bank, supra.
13 See Note, 9 Va. Law Rev. 644.
14 Ish v. Crane, 13 Ohio St. 616 (1862).
15 Ish v. Crane, supra; ci Moyers Coal Corp. v. Whited, 157 Va. 302,
160 S.E. 43 (1931).
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of falling upon innocent third parties dealing with an agent whom they

may have known and dealt with for years in .his recognized capacity?
This appears to be a case involving equal equities and calling for an

application of the maxim of law and equity that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer, he shall suffer who by his silence or misconduct has permitted the injury to occur. The principal's successors
succeed to all of his liabilities and assets. In reason and good sense why
should they not also succeed to the responsibilities he has assumed by the
appointment of an agent?
But even if legal theory were so aligned with the common law
doctrine as to "enjoin" judicial dissension, the inequitable results neces-

sarily flowing from its application would suffice in themselves to require
statutory modification.
". the so-called common law rule must always and frequently
result in cases of terrible injustice and wrong; cases not exceptional
in their character, but flowing naturally and generally from the
inherent viciousness of the rule itself." 16
Examples are plentiful. In Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Wilson, 17

heirs of a deceased landlord brought. an action for rent. The landlord
was a resident of Cuba who had entrusted the collection of rents to
an agent of many years standing. Unknown to the tenants and the
agent, the landlord died. The rental payments made subsequent to the
death of the landlord were not accounted for by the agent, and plaintiffs
sued on the theory that the payments to the agent being unauthorized
after the death of the principal, the rent was still owing. The court held
for the plaintiffs, thus imposing upon the tenants a double liability.
In Weber v. Bridgman, 1' a mortgagor paid off a mortgage note to a
mortgagee's agent in ignorance of the death of the mortgagee and
received a satisfaction from the agent. In a*subsequent foreclosure suit
by the successors of the mortgagee, it was held that the satisfaction was
invalid, the debt still owing, the mortgagor's defense of payment unavailing.
The astounding contention was once made by a proponent of the
common law rule that "in the normal case, justice to the third person
demands the connon law rule contended for." 1 9 To prove this point,
the hypothetical case is cited wherein goods are sold to a person solely
upon his personal credit, the vendor realizing that the principal vendee's
liabilities exceed his assets but going through with the transaction solely
because of his personal faith in the vendee. It must be admitted that
if the principal had died unbeknown prior to the execution of the
transaction, the vendor would have the onerous problem of collecting
a just debt from an insolvent estate. But do not the peculiar facts of
this hypothetical case impress-upon the vendee the burden to inquire

into the continued life of the principal? If the life of the principal is
J6 Brinkerhoff, J. concurring in Ish v. Crane, 13 Ohio St. 574.
17 Note 3, supra.
i Note 2, supra.

19 See Note, 9 Va. Law Rev. 646 (1922).
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the sole stimulus of the transaction, should not the third party check
his stimulus before committing himself?
The arguments against the new Florida statute are purely formal
and technical. The conclusion is inescapable that the modification of the
common law rule is an intelligent and progressive step, and one whichin the words of Chief Justice Teehee in Catlin v. Reed, 20 "will best
subserve the conditions and wants of the people of this state, and thus
enable them to transact the business of our ever-expanding commercial
life now conducted through multiplied agencies, with a proper sense
of safety and security."
It would be improper to end this comment, however, without mentioning what appears to be a serious inconsistency in the statute itself.
By its express terms the statute makes the knowledge of the party dealing
with the agent the fulcrum upon which the validity of acts consummated subsequent to the death of the principal rests. The statute
first states:
"If any agent .....
.shall do any act for his principal which
would be binding if such principal were living, the same shall be
valid and binding notwithstanding ...; provided the party dealing

with the agent dealt bona fide not knowing at the time of doing
such act that the principal was dead." 2'

(Italics supplied)

This would seem to make the knowledge of the agent immaterial.
Nevertheless the statute goes on to provide:
"An affidavit, executed by the attorney in fact or agent setting
forth that he has not or had not at the time of doing any act
pursuant to the power of attorney, received actual knowledge or
actual notice of the death of the principal or notice of any facts
indicating such death, shall in the absence of fraud be conclusive
proof of the absence of knowledge by the agent of the death of
the principal at such time." (Italics supplied)
Since it is the knowledge of the party dealing with the agent-not
that of the agent-that determines the validity of the action taken, it
is submitted that the affidavit provision as it stands is meaningless
surplusage. A legislative amendment giving similar effect to an affidavit
executed by the third party would be more in consonance with the
22
purpose and intent of the statute.
20 Note 10, supra.

See Note 1, supra for entire text.
22 Such an amendment would be particularly welcomed by title and
abstract examiners since an affidavit of the grantee of a deed or the
assignee of a mortgage executed under a power of attorney would then
relieve the examiner of the task of inquiring Into the continued life
of the principal.
21

